Last update: Friday 4/4/25
Readers of this blog may wonder why this topic is being addressed. This blog is supposed to focus on generative AI. Indeed, the words generative AI and related words, such as “chatbots” and “agents”, are mostly mentioned as the primary tools the editor used to conduct his investigation. But genAI agents move front and center, suddenly and appropriately, in the final section of this note as the core components of the editor’s recommendations.
A. Introduction | B. Signal Administration | C. Media Timelines | D. The Double-hack
Part A. Introduction
WhatsApp, a secure Meta/Facebook communications app features end-to-end encryption, and has about 2 billion users worldwide. Signal also features end-to-end encryption, but only has about 40 million users. Knowing that Elon Musk has been one of the most effective promoters of the secure Signal communications app ever since he tweeted "Use Signal" on 7Jan21, the editor assumes that Michael Waltz, the National Security Adviser, convened the war planning chat group using Signal because of Musk's strong recommendation.
But first, some disclaimers:
- The editor of this blog is a libertarian who votes as a registered Democrat.
- The editor holds the vast majority of Elon Musk's DOGE activities in the utmost contempt.
- The editor, being a retired tech, still has the highest possible respect for Elon Musk's technical expertise and his technical intuition. So if Musk strongly recommended that the group use Signal for its war planning chat, the editor believes that Waltz's decision to use it cannot be denounced without a much closer examination of what actually happened.
Although the editor has been aware of Signal for many years, he never used it because he never felt the personal or professional need for such an elevated level of security. He therefore had to learn about the administration of the Signal app from his favorite tech instructor, ChatGPT, mostly running OpenAI’s Deep Research agent.
Being an experienced user of ChatGPT, the editor is keenly aware of certain principles of its effective usage.
- Everything the chatbot says must checked by reference to an authoritative source.
- Everything the chatbot says must be checked for internal consistency.
- Important queries must be posed to the chatbot more than once, each time in a somewhat different manner, e.g., as requests for "clarification".
This note has three more parts:.
- Part B presents some "administrative facts of life" about Signal that everyone concerned about this leaky chat needs to know know, but probably doesn't, including many "experienced" Signal users, e.g., reporters, who were never administrators of Signal chats. These facts are presented in the format of the chatbot's answers to a series of of questions, more specifically, the chatbot's answers to the final versions of questions posed by the editor many times.
- Part C presents the timeline of the main group chat events as reported in major media.
- Part D provides a detailed description of a double-hack phishing scenario wherein the hacker tricked a naive member of the of the planning group into scanning a QR code that had been generated on the hacker's remote desktop computer, an action that thereby designated the hacker's desktop computer as one of the member's "linked devices". Scanning that QR code was one the worst possible violations of Signal's security procedures. But that's what phishing strategies are designed to do, i.e., to trick naive users into violating well designed security procedures.
The hacker then duped Jeffrey Goldberg, the esteemed editor-in-chief of the Atlantic, into thinking that he had become a member of an elite war planning group. But he had merely become a member of a phony group with the same name that was created by the hacker. The hacker then forwarded edited screenshots of the real chat group's messages that included the names of the speakers to Goldberg in the phony group. (Note: Speedy real-time editing of the screenshots to make them look realistic on Goldberg's phone might be "expensive" because the layout on the illicitly linked desktop from which they were captured would be different from the layout on Goldberg’s smartphone. No matter, because the cost would still be an affordable price for a "rich" Russian professional hacking team.)
So what difference does it make? Mr. Goldberg received messages that he should not have received, no matter why it happened. The difference lies in the intentions of the hacker. The hacker's choice of Mr. Goldberg as the second target of the double hack was brilliant because (a) as a super lefty, Goldberg was guaranteed to become an eager whistle blower, and (b) because the hacker correctly anticipated that Mr. Waltz was naive enough have no clue as to how Goldberg got into his group.
The lightning-quick consequence of Waltz's inability to explain how he himself had apparently admitted Jeffrey Goldberg, a prominent critic of President Trump, into the real planning group by "accident" made Waltz look profoundly foolish. It made the whole planning group look profoundly foolish, and irresponsible, and incompetent ... which is exactly what Mr. Vladimir Putin, the hacker's ultimate boss, wanted to happen ... to have the whole world talking about America's profoundly foolish, irresponsible, incompetent leaders ... rather than talking about Mr. Putin's continued bombing of Ukrainian civilians. Timing is everything.
The final section provides suggestions as to how to prevent this kind of fiasco from happening again. Mr. Goldberg did not perceive the con before he published his revelations; but Mr. Waltz should have understood as soon as Goldberg blew his whistle. The Pentagon did not publish its warning about Russian professional hackers tricking U.S. government officials using Signal into scanning bogus QR codes until a couple of days after the bombing of the Houthis. Nevertheless, the twenty years experience of the editor of this blog as a consultant to various federal agencies, including the Department of Defense, leaves no doubt in his mind that a draft of such an important report had been sent to the National Security Advisor and to other cabinet officials for their review and comments weeks, perhaps months before it was published.
As an experienced leader of tech support teams, the has concluded that the failure of Mr. Waltz to perceive the hack despite this warning reflected his inadequate training with regards to the basic facts of Signal administration, a systemic shortfall that probably afflicted most of the cabinet level members in the chat group.
Part B. Signal Admin Basics
Question 1.
When the organizer of a Signal chat sends out invitations, they are really sending out a link to an invitation page. When the recipient clicks the link, the page is displayed on the recipient’s screen. The recipient then accepts the invitation or rejects it, right?
When the organizer of a Signal chat sends out invitations, they are really sending out a link to an invitation page. When the recipient clicks the link, the page is displayed on the recipient’s screen. The recipient then accepts the invitation or rejects it, right?
- Answer
Yes. When a Signal group organizer enables the group link feature, they generate a unique invitation link. Anyone who receives it can tap the link, see basic group info (like the group name), and choose to accept or decline the invitation to join.
Note that an invitation link can also be embedded in a QR code. For example, here's a step-by-step guide to reading QR codes on an iPhone.Use Live Text (Built-in QR Recognition)
This works if the QR code is in an image or on a webpage you’re viewing.
1. Tap and hold your finger on the QR code image.2. If iOS recognizes it, you’ll see a pop-up like “Open in Safari” or “QR Code Detected”—tap that.
Option 2: Use the Camera App (for physical QR codes)
If the QR code is on another screen (like a laptop, poster, or another phone):
1. Open the Camera app.
2. Point it steadily at the QR code.
3. A yellow notification banner should appear at the top with a link—tap it to open.
Question 2.
Although Signal groups can be anonymous, in this case it is certain that the invitation page would specify the members’ real identities of the 20 top-level members of the administration who were involved in this discussion, right?
- Answer
Yes. While Signal allows anonymous participation by default (users are identified only by phone numbers or display names), in a high-level government group like this, it’s very likely that members would be expected to set recognizable display names or titles to confirm their identity to others—especially in sensitive, exclusive discussions involving national security.
Question 3.
If the organizer of the chat, in this case the National Security Advisor, received a response that indicated that it came from JD Vance, the organizer would check whether this was an appropriate response from the person that he sent the invitation to, right?
- Answer.
Yes. The National Security Advisor would be expected to verify that a response labeled as coming from “JD Vance” actually matches the invitation sent to the real Vice President. In a secure, high-level setting, confirming identity—especially for someone of that rank—would be a standard and necessary step.
Question 4.
The Pentagon Warning stated that hackers were using Signal's linked device mechanism as part of the hack. What is a linked device?
- Answer.
A linked device in Signal is any additional device (like a computer or tablet) that a user links to their primary Signal account (usually on their phone). Once linked—by scanning a QR code—this device receives all future messages sent to the user, just like the primary device.
Question 5.
Does Signal enable the organizer of a chat to identify the devices linked to the legitimate members of the chat?
- Answer.
No. Signal does not allow a group organizer (or any participant) to see the linked devices linked to other members’ accounts. Only the account owner can view and manage their own linked devices.
Question 6.
How do the legitimate members of a group link devices to themselves? In order to limit the size of this basic section, only provide a step-by-step description for a member who has an iPhone because Android phones involve a similar procedure.
- Answer.
How to Link a Device to Signal on iPhone
1. Open Signal on the new device (e.g., Signal Desktop on your Mac or PC). A QR code will be displayed on the screen.
2. On your iPhone, open Signal.
3. Go to Settings, then tap your profile icon in the top-left, then tap “Linked Devices.”
4. Tap “Link New Device”
5. Use your iPhone to scan the QR code shown on the new device.
6. Confirm the link. Signal will ask for confirmation. Once approved, the new device is linked and will sync future messages. Only someone with access to the iPhone can complete this process.
Question 7.
Can a user designate devices owned by members of their staff as linked devices? And how would they do that?
- Answer.
Yes. A user can designate staff-owned devices as linked devices if the user has physical access to those devices during the linking process.
How to Do It:
1. Install Signal Desktop on the staff member’s device (e.g., their laptop).
2. On that device, open Signal to display the QR code.
3. On the user’s iPhone, go to Settings > Linked Devices > Link New Device.
4. Scan the QR code from the staff member’s device using the iPhone.
5. Confirm the link. The staff member’s device is now a linked device for the user’s Signal account.
The staff member can now see and respond to all Signal messages received by the user.
Question 8.
You have referred to QR codes being generated by the perspective linked device. Does the device generate the same QR code whenever it is asked, or does it change?
- Answer.
It changes. Each time you attempt to link a new device in Signal, it generates a unique, one-time-use QR code. This code is valid only for that specific linking session and expires shortly if not used, about one to two minutes later. It is not reused or permanent.
Question 9.
Yes or no, is there any other way to designate a device as a “linked device” other than using QR codes?
Yes or no, is there any other way to designate a device as a “linked device” other than using QR codes?
- Answer
No. Signal only allows a device to be designated as a linked device through the QR code scanning process. There is no alternative method such as clicking a link, entering a code, or email-based pairing.
Question 10.
Answer yes or no. Can the owner of a linked device, such as a staff member, designate another device as a linked device linked to the member of the chat group?
- Answer
No. Only the primary account holder (the person with the main Signal phone) can authorize new linked devices. A staff member using a linked device cannot link additional devices on behalf of that account.
Question 11.
Answer yes or no. Can an iPhone of a staff member be a linked device?
- Answer
No. Signal does not allow iPhones or Android phones to be used as linked devices. Only Signal Desktop or Signal iPad can be linked as additional devices.
Question 12.
How does a new Signal user learn about linked devices and the step-by-step procedure for designating a device as linked? Does signal provide this kind of step-by-step descriptions, such as you've given me?
- Answer
Yes. Signal provides official step-by-step instructions for linking linked devices on its support website. These guides include clear directions for iPhone and Android users, including screenshots and security warnings.
Users can access this information by visiting:
https://supFconnecport.signal.org
and searching for “Linked Devices.”
Question 13.
Can you think of any other important basic feature that I've left out?
- Answer
Here’s what you cannot see or manage as a Signal group organizer:
1. Linked Devices
You cannot see or manage which devices other members have linked to their accounts. A participant may be reading messages on multiple devices—without your knowledge.
2. Message Forwarding or Copying
Signal does not restrict or alert you when someone copies messages, takes screenshots, or forwards content into another group or private chat. This creates a risk of silent leaks.
3. Disappearing Message Compliance
You can set a disappearing message timer, but members can still copy or screenshot messages before they disappear. And there’s no enforcement or record of what they did with the content.
Question 14.
There's been a lot of talk in the media about Signal deleting all messages, so no permanent records of Signal chats can be retained as required by law for archives. I now know this is not true. Can you provide a concise explanation of how permanent records could be retained by Signal after they had "disappeared" from the phones of the participants in a Signal chat?
There's been a lot of talk in the media about Signal deleting all messages, so no permanent records of Signal chats can be retained as required by law for archives. I now know this is not true. Can you provide a concise explanation of how permanent records could be retained by Signal after they had "disappeared" from the phones of the participants in a Signal chat?
-
Answer.
When Signal’s "disappearing messages" feature is enabled, each participant controls how long their own messages remain on everyone’s devices. Once a message expires, it’s permanently deleted from:
-- A sender's phone.
-- All of the phones that received the sender's messages.
-- All of the devices linked to the sender's phone (e.g., desktops, tablets).This means that, without active planning, if all of the participants make their up messages disappear, a full record of the conversation may be gone within minutes or hours from the phones of all of the participants in the chat and from all of the devices linked to all of the participants' phones.
For hosts responsible for compliance with the requirement for creating a full record of the chat for archives, this presents a challenge. Here is a two-part strategy for meeting this challenge. Of course there are other ways to meet this challenge that will also satisfy all of the requirements.
Part 1:
Archiving the Conversation as HostTo retain a complete record before messages vanish, the host should:
1. Link a Desktop Device to their own phone.
• Set up a device before the meeting as a "linked device" .
• This will store a local copy of all messages sent and received from that point forward.
2. Ask Participants to Set Disappearing Timers
• At the end of the meeting, instruct all participants to set the same disappearing message timer (e.g., 1 hour).
• Remind them:
“When the timer hits, your messages will auto-delete from all phones and desktops.”
3. Archive Before Messages Disappear
• Within that window, e.g., one hour, the host should open Signal Desktop on his/her linked device.
• Copy and paste the entire chat into a secure document.
• Save it as a PDF
• Store the archive in line with your records or security policy (e.g., ZIP and encrypt if necessary).
Part 2:
Monitoring Disappearing Message ComplianceBecause Signal does not enforce universal message timers, the host cannot guarantee deletion unless participants follow through. To address this:
1. Wait and Recheck
• After the 1-hour timer (or 2 hours for safety), review the conversation in Signal Desktop.
• If messages from certain participants have not disappeared, that means they did not set their timer correctly.
2. Send Targeted Reminders
• Follow up directly or in the group chat:
“Reminder: I still see messages from a few people. Please ensure you’ve deleted the thread or set the 1-hour timer.”
3. Escalate Gently If Needed
• If someone is unresponsive (e.g., “Bill”), the host might write:
“Has anyone heard from Bill? His messages are still visible. Please nudge him to delete or set the timer.”
4. Document Noncompliance (if necessary)
• If required by policy, note whose messages persisted and how follow-up was handled.
Disappearing messages protect privacy—but they depend on user discipline.The host can’t enforce compliance, but can:
• Preserve a full archive via desktop before deletion.
• Monitor for missing deletions after the session.
• Remind and coordinate cleanup to maintain group integrity.
Part C. Media Timeline
Question.
Can you provide me with a timeline of the most significant events as they were reported in major media about the planning chat group fiasco?
Can you provide me with a timeline of the most significant events as they were reported in major media about the planning chat group fiasco?
Answer.
Certainly, here’s a detailed timeline of the events surrounding the inadvertent inclusion of journalist Jeffrey Goldberg in a high-level U.S. government Signal group chat discussing military operations in Yemen. This timeline is based on reports from The Atlantic and other reputable sources:
March 11, 2025 ... Formation of the Signal Group Chat
- National Security Advisor Michael Waltz established a Signal group chat named “Houthi PC small group,” including several high-ranking officials such as Vice President J.D. Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, and others.
- Source: “United States government group chat leak” - Wikipedia
March 13, 2025: Jeffrey Goldberg Added to the Group
- Michael Waltz mistakenly added Jeffrey Goldberg, editor-in-chief of The Atlantic, to the Signal group chat. Goldberg was unaware of the reason for the invitation but accepted, gaining access to sensitive discussions.
- Source: “The Trump Administration Accidentally Texted Me Its War Plans” - The Atlantic
March 14, 2025: Discussion of Military Action
- The group engaged in detailed discussions about imminent military strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen, including operational details such as targets, weapons, and sequencing. Goldberg remained a silent observer during these exchanges.
- Source: “United States government group chat leak” - Wikipedia
March 15, 2025: Execution of the Military Strikes
- At approximately 11:44 a.m. EDT, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth shared detailed operational information indicating that strikes were to commence around 1:45 p.m. EDT. Subsequent reports confirmed that explosions occurred in Sanaa, Yemen, aligning with the discussed plans.
- Source: “The Trump Administration Accidentally Texted Me Its War Plans” - The Atlantic
March 18, 2025: The Pentagon’s warning that Russians hackers were “phishing” Signal app users via its "linked devices" feature
- "Days after the Signal leak, the Pentagon warned the app was the target of hackers", Quil Lawrence and Tom Bowman, NPR, 3/25/25
-- This article contains an image of a printed copy of the warning. Readers can view a copy of this image ➡ HERE
The image contains the following statement:
-- "Russian professional hacking groups are employing the "linked devices" feature to spy on encrypted conversations. The feature allows the chat and voice messenger application to be utilized on multiple devices concurrently. The hacking groups embed malicious QR codes in phishing pages or conceal them in group invite links. After gaining access via the malicious code the groups add their own devices as a linked device. This allows the group to view every message sent by the unwitting user in real time, bypassing the end-to-end encryption."
-- Readers should note that the "malicious code" referred to in the image is merely Signal's normal response when a user scans the QR code that appears on any desktop device. That's how users are supposed to link desktop devices to their phones. With regards to the linking of desktop devices, Signal users are only supposed to scan QR codes on desktop screens that they themselves have generated or their staff have generated under their supervision. Any other request to scan is a hacker's request. See Question 6 (above)
March 24, 2025: Jeffrey Goldberg’s Revelation
- Jeffrey Goldberg published an article in The Atlantic detailing his inadvertent inclusion in the Signal group chat and the sensitive information he was privy to. This disclosure raised significant concerns about the security protocols of the administration.
- Source: “The Trump Administration Accidentally Texted Me Its War Plans” - The Atlantic
March 26, 2025: Gabbard's testimony before House Intelligence Committee
- Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard testified to House Intelligence Committee members that encrypted messaging app Signal comes “pre-installed” on government devices — a potentially major shift in official communications on the heels of a massive Chinese government-linked hack of U.S. telecommunications networks last year. This new policy is the most impressive manifestations of Elon Musk's effectiveness as a promoter of Signal within the Trump administration.
- Source: "Gabbard says Signal comes ‘pre-installed’ on government devices", Politico
Part D. Alternative Timeline + Double-Hack + Recommendations
In his disclaimer’s third point at the beginning of this long note, the editor of this blog declared that he still had the highest possible respect for Mr. Elon Musk’s technical expertise and his technical intuition. Therefore the initial goal of the editor’s intensive investigation was to determine whether Signal was really as good as Musk had claimed.
But when the editor learned that the Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, had proclaimed that Signal was now “pre-installed” on all government phones, the goal of the editor’s investigation changed.
Signal’s critics may be correct. It may not be good enough to handle communications that require the highest levels of security. But Ms. Gabbard’s declaration made that assessment irrelevant. Elections have consequences, and one of those consequences has been Signal’s movement to the center of the board as the Trump Administration’s primary messaging service.
So the goal of this final section of the editor’s investigation has now become the determination of whether the war planning chat group had used Signal as effectively as possible; and then make a few recommendations as to how Signal might be used more effectively in the future.
Now let’s construct an alternative timeline, an unusual timeline in which the sequence of events is not determined by their chronological occurrence, but by the order in which the editor of this blog became aware of them during his investigation … and it only includes two of the events listed in the media timeline because that’s all the editor needed to consider.
An Alternative Timeline …
March 24, 2025: Jeffrey Goldberg’s Revelation
- Like most people, the editor first became aware of the chat group fiasco from Goldberg’s article in the Atlantic in which he claimed that he had inducted into a war planning chat group that included the vice president, the secretary of defense, the director of the CIA, President Trump‘s national security advisor, and many other luminaries in the Trump administration. The editor’s initial reactions to this piece Was the same as everybody else else’s … Shock, cynical amusement … but ultimately, disbelief. There had to be another explanation.
So the editor asked ChatGPT to provide him with links to other articles that described the fiasco. ChatGPT‘s response included the answer to his question in an unexpected source, the description provided by NPR, a description that became the second event in the editor’s timeline.
March 18, 2025: The Pentagon’s warning that Russians hackers were “phishing” Signal app users via its "linked devices" feature
- This warning was consistent with the editor’s decades of experience as a leader of tech support teams. When apps are so well designed that hackers find that they cannot disrupt the apps, they go “phishing” ➡ the hackers trick the app’s users into disrupting the app’s secure procedures.
In this case, the hacker tricked one of the group’s members into scanning a QR code that had been generated by the hacker’s desktop computer. As per ChatGPT’s answer to the blog editor’s Question 6 (above), the Signal app then did what it was supposed to do whenever a member scans that kind of a QR code: it linked the hacker’s desktop computer to the member’s phone. Thereafter as a “linked device” the hacker’s desktop computer automatically received a copy of every message the member sent or received.
The Double-hack
“Your linked device verification was incomplete. Scan the attached QR code for secure access. Expires in 10 mins.”
The message implies that the user did something not quite right when the user scanned the previous expiring QR code that linked the desktop to his phone (Question 8). When the editor linked one of his desktops to his iPhone, it took about an hour, a surprisingly long amount of time because there was only one message in his own phony "Houthi PC small group". So the suggestion that a connection was not complete is credible.
The message assumes that most, if not all of the real members of the chat group had at least one linked device: their own desktop computer. And the editor also assumes that Mr. Putin’s gangs of professional hackers had somehow discovered the existence of this group, its name, its organizer, and the names and the government telephone numbers for at least a few members of the group. Far fetched assumptions? Not really, given the scope and depth of some recent massive hacking operations, e.g., the Chinese hack, Salt Typhoon, cited by Director Gabbard in her testimony,
Recommendations
This long note began with disclaimers and this final segment also begins with disclaimers:
This long note began with disclaimers and this final segment also begins with disclaimers:
- The editor of this blog is convinced that Signal is an excellent open source app and therefore a great candidate for consideration as the Trump administration’s default messaging app.
- However, the editor also agrees with critics that the open source version of this app would provide inadequate security for naïve users, i.e., for users who are not techs, because naive users could be hacked too easily by gangs of professional hackers employing phishing techniques.
- Furthermore, the cumbersome Signal administrative procedures (Question 14) required to preserve copies of important conversations for archives would not be easily mastered by naïve users, e.g., cabinet members and other high-level administrators who would be the hosts/organizers of the most important group chats.
- If Signal were rolled out over a three to five year time span, there would be sufficient time to train cadres of new tech support teams who could administer the open source version of Signal.
But Director Gabbard just asserted that Signal is being installed on all federal government phones NOW … So we don’t have time to train all those new tech support teams … We need to modify Signal. We need to modify Signal now … We need to fork the latest distribution and add customized modifications.
Modify Signal? Modify an excellent open source app? Before proceeding any further, the editor is compelled to issue one more disclaimer:
Modify Signal? Modify an excellent open source app? Before proceeding any further, the editor is compelled to issue one more disclaimer:
- The editor is a firm, almost lifelong believer in the inherent superiority of open source software over proprietary closed software. Deep in his gut, he anticipates, he fears, a deluge of dubious “improvements” … Ugh!
The editor is embarrassed to admit that it took a few days for him to perceive the blindingly obvious resolution of this paradox ➡ Agents. Generative AI agents. The same gizmos he had been using to conduct his investigation. Agents can't be phished. 😎😎😎
Recommendation 1.
- Keep Signal as distributed, but require most federal employees to manage Signal through agents for their meetings and other confidential communications. But cabinet members and other high level officials should employ talented techs to manage Signal for their meetings and other important communications. The techs will manage Signal using special agents that can be configured to provide more powerful options that are tailored to meet the changing needs of this elite group.
Recommendation 2.
- Contracts for the required ultra high speed development of reliable, effective agents should not be awarded to Elon Musk.
His wearing a DOGE cap and a tech cap caused many potential Tesla buyers to reject his Tesla technology because of their antipathy to his DOGE politics. So too within the federal government’s tech communities: opposition to his DOGE politics may cause opposition to his agents, but disguised as “deep concerns” about the reliability of generative AI.
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