Last update: 7:36am Wednesday 11/26/25
This note, Part 2 in what was originally planned to be a three part series, will now be the final installment. It highlights some operational structures of the PJM that facilitated the stunning success of Virginia’s Data Center Alley. Then it sketches a strategy that might enable the founding members of the PJM -- Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland -- to join Virginia as major national and international data center hubs via consortiums that would also guarantee stable lower electricity bills for their regular customers, i.e., households, businesses, schools, government agencies, etc.
Unfortunately, recent surprising announcements from two powerful utilities — Dominion and Exelon — threaten to burden regular customers throughout the 13 states in the PJM with historically high electricity bills. Exelon’s announcement requires extensive revisions to Section F and Dominion’s requires the addition of a forthcoming Section G to this note.
Traditional vs. Divested utilities
Much of our doscissopm focuses on the markedly different impacts of PJM policies and procedures on traditional vs. divested utilities.
Much of our doscissopm focuses on the markedly different impacts of PJM policies and procedures on traditional vs. divested utilities.
- Traditional electric utilities are vertically integrated, i.e. they own all of the power generators and all of the transmission lines within their service areas.
- Prodded by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in the early 1990's, some states required their utilities to divest their power generation and transmission assets, retaining only the distribution lines that connected to their customers, i.e., households, businesses, government agencies, etc, etc, etc.
- The power generators of divested utilities were now owned by other independent companies. Sometimes the high voltage transmission lines were owned by the independent power companies; but sometimes they, too, were owned by still other independent companies.
Disclaimer: The editor of this blog cannot certify that the managers of traditional and divested electric utilities within the PJM actually follow the strategies described in the following sections. He merely identifies strategies that rational managers of utilities might follow, strategies that are legal and ethical.
- As a “to-the-bone Libra" who therefore has a congenital compulsion to see the "other guy's" point of view, the editor has developed the following detailed analysis as an alternative to the "We are the Good people. They are the Evil ones" superficial blather that has filled too much of our nation's tech media, general media, and the mouths of our political leaders in recent months.
- He suggests that it might be more constructive to assume that all of the major players are merely doing what they are supposed to do to survive and thrive in the PJM's competitive marketplace that was encouraged by federal regulators Unfortunately, things did not turn out the way the feds anticipated.
- As the reader will discover, the editor's analysis also challenges the EIA's recent finding that transmission costs are driving higher electricity bills, especially the costs incurred by the construction of new high voltage lines that connect to new generators. Higher transmission costs do drive wholesale and retail prices higher for divested utilities but not for traditional utilities within the PJM. And they are driving divested utility costs higher because of the costs of new transmission lines to all of the other generators outside of a divested utility’s service area, old and new. So the feds are still getting it wrong about the PJM.
- Our "rational, but ethical major players" framework is applied throughout the text of the following analysis. Unfortunately its "ethical" component must be abandoned in our forthcoming Section G that discusses the challenges posed by rational, but unchecked corporate greed.
A. Overview | B. Closing Price | C. Traditional Capital |
D. Transmission Lines | E. Data Centers |
D. Transmission Lines | E. Data Centers |
A. Overview
Federal regulators anticipated that the competition among the operators of generators and transmission lines would yield lower wholesale prices for divested utilities which, in turn, would yield lower electricity bills for their customers.
Federal regulators also assumed that given enough time, traditional electric utilities would see the financial advantages of adopting a divested configuration. These assumptions might have sounded plausible in normal times wherein the growth of local demand for electricity was steady and predictable.
Unfortunately, these assumptions failed to foresee that the new Internet would facilitate the rapid rise of "the cloud" and its clusters of energy hungry data centers in the early 2000s -- first AOL, Netflix, and AWS. Next came the truly explosive growth of hyperscale data centers supporting chatbots and large language models in the early 2020s after the release of ChatGPT running on GPT 3.5 … after which the energy demands of the hyperscales have become insatiable.
The following discussion will argue that it is a supreme irony that, within the specific context of the PJM that the traditional utilities within the PJM, not the divested utilities, have become the primary beneficiaries of the unanticipated rise of data centers, then hyperscale data centers.
B. Supply vs Demand vs "closing price"
Any analysis that does not address the energy marketplace managed by the PJM employing its own unique procedures is likely to get it wrong. So here’s a quick overview of its most relevant features. This section is required reading for readers who are not well versed in these procedures. Readers who want a more complete description are referred to Part 1 of these notes.
- The PJM takes ongoing real time surveys of the demands from each utility in the PJM, i.e., the "load" each will need in the next five minutes. Let's focus on Utility1. Each generator responds with an "offer" of how much power it can supply in the next five minute and at what price to Utility1.
1) Suppose generator Gen1 offers P1 power for the lowest price p1. The PJM accepts this offer, where p1 specifies the price per megawatt hour
2) If P1 is lower than the total required load that needs to be supplied to Utility1, the PJM accepts the next lowest price p2 for power P2 from another generator Gen2. Note that the p1 price per megawatt hour < p2 price per megawatt hour,
3) If the total power P1 + P2 is less than L, the required load, the PJM accepts the third lowest priced supply P3 at price p3 from a third generator Gen3. Note that p1 < p2 < p3. - Now suppose that offers P1 + P2 + P3 = L ... the required load. The PJM then regards p3 as the "closing price" and requires the utility to pay each generator at the same price p3 for the next five minutes. Yes, generators Gen1 and Gen2 will be paid a higher price per megawatt hour than they asked to be paid; so they will be making more profit than they expected -- a PJM "bonus".
- It's easy to see that the offers from generators that have the most efficient equipment will be accepted more often than offers from less efficient generators. So the owners of generators will be motivated to maintain their generators in the most productive conditions. Indeed, the owners will be even more motivated to add more generators and/or to upgrade the tech they employ to gain competitive advantages over the owners of other power generators in the 13 state PJM region.
- Maintenance costs money, but adding more generators and/or technology upgrades cost even more money. So where will the owners obtain these needed funds?
C. Traditional Utilities Have Superior Access to Capital
This is the biggest advantage enjoyed by the traditional utilities in the PJM. Traditional utilities can find money for capital expenditures from more sources and from cheaper sources than utilities. Here are the 7 states that have divested utilities = Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan … plus the District of Columbia.
Divested utilities only own the distribution lines that connect their customers to the high voltage transmission lines that deliver electricity from power generators. Distribution lines need to be maintained and they must be extended when new customers appear in previously unoccupied locations. These utilities must ensure that they maintain appropriate connections to the high voltage transmission networks so that they can receive power from generators that are located anywhere within the 13 state PJM region. That's all.
Now let’s consider the independent power company whose generators are located within a divested utility's service area. It no longer has any relationship with this utility, so its decisions about maintaining, adding more generators, or upgrading do not involve special consideration for the anticipated power requirements of the local utility.
Now let's pose this same question to a traditional utility company, the owner of all the generators in its service area.
Now let’s consider the independent power company whose generators are located within a divested utility's service area. It no longer has any relationship with this utility, so its decisions about maintaining, adding more generators, or upgrading do not involve special consideration for the anticipated power requirements of the local utility.
- Question: Where will the independent power companies get its funding?
- Answer: From profits, investors, and bankers (loans that must be repaid with interest)
Now let's pose this same question to a traditional utility company, the owner of all the generators in its service area.
- Question: Where will the traditional utility get its funding for additional maintenance, more generators, or upgrades?
Answer: From the additional revenue it will obtain from raising the rates it charges its retail customers for the power they use, after obtaining permission to raise its rates from its state regulators.
- Question : Why would state regulators approve rate increases that would immediately result in higher electric bills for customers within their state
Answer: Here are three reasons:
1)The primary reason why traditional utilities joined the PJM was to obtain greater assurance that membership in the PJM would substantially reduce the risk of their state being sucked into a catastrophe like the infamous Northeast Blackout of 1965. Having larger in-state power generation capacity would further reduce this risk. It would also increase the utility’s capacity to handle temporary surges in demand for power from their in-state customers.
2) State regulators limit utilities to earning modest returns on capital investments (typically 7-10% on equity). This constraint reassures regulators that rate increases won't generate excessive profits. Any profits beyond the allowed return could be used to maintain stable rates for customers over longer periods, even as inflation drives up the utility's costs for supplies and salaries, or they could result in flat-out rate reductions.
3) Ever since the 1990s, utilities have witnessed the rise of power hungry data centers, starting with AOL, Netflix, and Amazon's AWS. Farsighted state regulators should have encouraged their traditional utilities to expand their power generation capacity in order to capture a larger share of this emerging data center market throughout this period.
D. Transmission lines previously owned by divested utilities will charge higher wholesale electricity prices to their former owners … which will yield higher electricity bills for the customers of their former owners.
- Orders to traditional utilities to divest their power generation and transmission assets enabled the divested utilities to receive power from any generator within the PJM; but those orders did not enable the divested utilities to receive power through any transmission lines other than the ones they previously owned. So divested utilities had no choice but to use their old transmission lines to receive power from generators outside of their service areas.
- The configuration of the local transmission lines had been optimized to deliver power to the local divested utility from local generators; they were not optimized to deliver power to the divested utility from power generators, old or new, from outside of the utility's service area.
- So the owners of the local transmission lines had no incentives to spend more money to maintain their current lines nor to invest capital to improve their lines until they received substantial evidence that their current lines could not deliver the power requested by the local divested utility from the other generators currently favored by the utility in an effective manner.
- At that point they would “suddenly” spend whatever was necessary to “catch up” and receive approval from state and federal regulators to raise the wholesale rates they charged to the divested utilities that used to own them to recoup their expenditures.
- Indeed, the transmission owners would want to do more than catch up; they would want to get ahead of anticipated future needs for greater connectivity to outside generators. So the transmission owners would have to commit to larger expenditures that would justify their charging even higher wholesale prices to their former owner.
- Whenever the savings from closing prices tended to be smaller than the losses from higher transmission prices, the divested utility would have to raise the rates it charged to all of the customers in its service area, i.e., charge higher electric bills.
- This adjustment of the configuration of the transmission lines and the resulting higher wholesale prices for the local utility would be repeated every time a different set of outside generators became the local divested utility's most cost-effective sources of power.
- Consider the paradox: In their efforts to get the lowest prices for the power its customers need, divested utilities might have to increase their customers' electricity bills from time to time because the power is coming through different transmission lines.
Parris Glendenning, governor of Maryland from 1995 to 2003, probably anticipated this paradox. When a large bipartisan majority of the Maryland legislature passed a bill in 1999 that required the state’s electric utilities to sell off their generators and transmission lines, he threatened his veto. According to Wikipedia, “The bill was signed into law by Democratic Governor Parris Glendening who was not in favor of deregulation, but was threatened with an override if he opted to veto”. So he reluctantly signed the bill.
E. Why a traditional utility has attracted most of the hyperscsale data centers in the PJM.
At the beginning of this discussion, the editor stated that the "We are the Good people. They are the Evil ones" was superficial blather that has filled too much of our nation's tech media, general media, and the mouths of our political leaders in recent months. This was really a gross understatement. Reality is much worse. When someone calls someone else evil, the other person is likely to shake their head, hurl an equally vile epithet in return, then try to move on. But if you call them “stupid”, smart people who are called “stupid” will get angry. Such anger blocks all future discussions.
So this section begins with a demolition of four good vs. evil allegations. Each of these statements is patently false, no matter how many elected political leaders use them to rally their voters.
- Question 1 -- Can states require a Big Tech builder of large data centers to "bring their own power"?
Answer 1 -- Of course they can. But multi-trillion dollar Big Tech companies do not build their own power generators. They pay premium rates for guaranteed capacity from utilities. Amazon, Google, Microsoft, and Meta are paying Dominion Energy Virginia high rates for enormous levels of uninterrupted electrical power for their hyperscale centers in Data Center Alley.
- Question 2 — Are the data centers in Virginia on the same power grid, the PJM grid, as Dominion Energy Virginia’s regular customers?
Answer 2 — No, but for the sake of argument, let’s begin by assuming that they are.
- The data centers, especially the hyperscale centers interact with millions of customers per second. So they would need guarantees that the large capacity of electricity they need would always be there for them.
- Suppose Dominion assured them that if there was ever a power shortage that the PJM would back them up with all the power needed to keep their data centers running.
- Now the smart CEOs who are building these centers know that one of the most fundamental purposes of the PJM is to avoid widespread blackouts and even brownouts.
- These CEOs know that if Dominion ever failed to deliver the required massive amount of electric power that the PJM would direct the high voltage transmission lines connecting to Virginia to shut down. If not, other states might be sucked into a brownout, possibly a blackout. Therefore the data centers would be in darkness but the all of the customers in the rest of the 13 PJM states plus the District of Columbia would go on with business, as usual
- So the Smart CEOs would know that Dominion was lying to them. If the data centers really were on the PJM grid, the PJM would quickly move to shut all of their data centers down … as well as all of the other customers in Virginia.
- Of course, the smart leaders of Dominion would also know that the PJM would not back them up, so they would never tell such a stupid lie.
- The only plausible possibility is that the data centers are on a separate grid that has enough backup generators on this separate grid to keep the data centers in operation at all times and at full capacity.
- And this internal backup is the reason why Dominion has to charge the data centers substantially higher rates to support this guarantee … 😎
Bottom line: The trillion dollar Big Tech owners of data centers don’t have to “bring their own power” to Virginia; they buy it from Dominion on a separate grid for a hefty price.
Of course, when we say that Dominion has “two grids”, we really mean that some of the generators on its grid consistently produce power for data centers, while others consistently produce power for Dominion’s other customers. But this is a distinction without a difference. Given the massive power requirements of hyperscale data centers, most of Dominion’s generators probably support their needs.
— Ironically, we should expect that some of the backup generators that ‘guarantee’ the reliability of the data centers’ power will be exceptions to this rule. These backup generators will normally run at capacity serving PJM customers and participating in PJM’s ongoing five-minute energy auctions. But they can be reassigned—in seconds—to address sporadic surges in data center requirements.
In other words, some of Dominion’s state-of-the-art generators run at capacity serving the PJM (99.9% of time); but they are available to pivot instantly for data center surges (0.1% of time); then they return to PJM service after the data center surge is handled.
— This irony is compounded by Dominion’s likely use of generators in other states to provide the backup power that covers sporadic surges in the power required by its other customers. Indeed, as described in a subsequent paragraph, this is a primary benefit Virginia received by joining the PJM.
Understandably, the governors of the wealthy founding members of the PJM want their states to share in this bonanza, but they can’t do it the way Virginia did it because they were hoodwinked by shortsighted federal regulators into divesting themselves of their power generation and transmission assets … Nevertheless there is a rather obvious alternative win-win strategy that can achieve the governors’ goals, a strategy that will be sketched in the final sections of these notes.
- Question 3 — Given that Virginia has far more data centers than any state in the country, the electricity bills for everyone who isn’t running data centers must be sky high, right?
Answer 3 — Wrong. Up until now, electricity bills in Virginia have been among the lowest bills paid by ordinary customers in any state in the PJM. As noted in our previous discussion, electricity bills in divested states are driven higher by sporadic increases in transmission rates.
- Question 3a — Here’s a follow up question. If Dominion Energy in Virginia is doing so well, how come the outgoing governor of Virginia has been so critical of the PJM; why did he join the other three governors in making their proposal?
Answer 3b — The editor of this blog was puzzled by the outgoing governor’s longtime criticisms of the PJM. For example Governor Youngkin made the following statement at a recent conference.
“Indeed, instead of unlocking investment and fast tracking critical projects, PJM has instead been responsible for bottlenecks and delays that crush jobs, drive up utility bills and leave families and businesses hurting,” he said. “This is a crisis of not having enough power, and it is a crisis in confidence.”
-- "Pa. Gov. Shapiro said electric grid operator PJM needs reform to put consumers first", Peter Hall, Pennsylvania Capital-Star, 9/22/25
The editor reread the previous sections of his discussion, looked in the mirror, and said “Oh.”..
Let’s begin with the fact that Virginia has prospered because it ignored the advice of the PJM: it did not divest. Although the editor has only been preparing this analysis for the last two months, the previous sections of this discussion are peppered with his repeated criticisms of the short sighted judgments of federal regulators. Given that Dominion Energy is but one of many electrical utilities in Virginia, the editor can only imagine how many more shortfalls the outgoing governor perceived, some of which will be discussed in Section G.
And finally, it must be noted that Dominion was very lucky. Virginia did not require any of its utilities to divest their power and transmission assets and none of them chose to do so. They lookall remain vertically integrated
AOL started its data centers in northern Virginia in the 1990s, and then Netflix and Amazon joined in. Had AOL, Netflix, and Amazon started in another state, or even in a different part of Virginia, Dominion might have chosen to divest, just like utilities the other wealthy populous states in the PJM. So the editor has to agree with the outgoing governor’s repeated theme. The PJM would make better decisions if governors had seats mat the PJM’s decision tables.
- Question 4 — If Dominion put the data centers on their own grid and provided backup on that separate grid, why didn’t it do the same thing for its regular customers? Why did Dominium join The PJM?
Answer 4 — Dominion makes a modest profit from providing reliable service to its regular customers at the lowest affordable price.
If Dominion was totally self-sufficient, i.e., had enough backup generators, it could protect its regular customers from blackouts, brownouts, and unpredictable surges in demand; but its lowest price would not be affordable to most of its regular customers. That’s why it joined the PJM.
Nevertheless, its first line of defense, especially against sporadic surges in demand, would be its own backup generators.
Dominion can put some of its backup generators on the PJM grid at capacity and offer them at low prices because they’re very efficient. These generators and their output could be redirected to Dominion’s internal grid quickly. Other backup generators on Dominion’s internal grid operating at lower capacity could be ramped up to full capacity within 30 minutes.
F. Calvert Shield — a vertically integrated consortium … extensive revision in process
1. Governors inability to reverse divestments
Although the governors of other wealthy populous states might want to reverse their states’ decades old decisions to divest their power generation and transmission assets, a complete reversal might face formidable political and financial barriers.
- On the one hand, some of the political interests that backed the divestment might still have enough power to block its reversal.
- On the other hand, these assets were purchased by for profit companies. Given the enormous potential value of these assets to their their states as facilitators of hyperscale data centers, the current owners might demand sky high prices for their return. That’s the bad news.
2) A better way to “copy” Dominion
The good news is that it might not be necessary to recreate how Dominion began as to emulate what it has also become. Yes, Dominion began as a vertically integrated traditional utility and remains a vertically integrated utility; but it has also become a reliable generator of massive electrical power. The good news is that there is an obvious direct path which wealthy populous states might follow to become reliable massive power generators. Indeed, this path is so obvious that the editor of this blog suspects that the governors’ staffs might have dismissed it because obvious solutions rarely solve complex problems.
The implementation of this strategy might differ in significant details from one state to another. So the editor will now discuss a version that should work for Maryland, his longtime home state. Being a longtime resident he is aware of possibly unique features of Maryland, features whose counterparts in other states he might not perceive so quickly or so clearly. Nevertheless, the basic logic of this approach should apply to other wealthy populous states in the PJM.
- Dominion's vertical integration gives it control over all over the power generation and transmission in Virginia. As a utility, it raised capital by raising monthly rates on all of its customers to enhance its services AND invested the modest profits from these enhancements to construct a private electrical grid for data centers. Thereafter profits from its grid enabled it to expand the private grid and attract more data centers and more profits. In other words, Dominion entered a highly profitable virtuous cycle.
- Now suppose the governor of Maryland created a consortium that included all of the power generation and transmission companies in Maryland. With sufficient financial incentives provided by the governor’s office, the members of this consortium could be persuaded to upgrade and enhance their power generation and transmission technologies.
-- For example, The state could provide capital grants for new generation construction, issue low-interest bonds to finance the buildout, guarantee rate recovery for infrastructure investments, and streamline permitting ... thereby creating powerful financial incentives - The formation of this consortium would be facilitated by its small membership. The divested assets of Maryland’s four utilities are now owned by only a few companies:
-- Constellation Energy seems to own most of the power generation facillities, but there are other owners who would have to be included.
-- Similarly, Excelon owns the high voltage transmission lines for three of the divested utilities (Baltimore Gas & Electric (BGE), Pepco (Potomac Electric Power Company), and Delmarva Power. FirstEnergy owns the lines for Potomac Edison, the fourth divested utility. - The effectiveness and reliability of the consortium’s enhancements would be judged by the additional share of PJM loads that their facilities earned in the day-to-day PJM auctions.
- When the consortium’s facilities become reliable enough and effective enough to obtain shares of the PJM’s auctions that were comparable to Dominion’s shares, the consortium could reposition some of their facilities onto a private grid, just like Dominion had done.
- At this point they could engage Big Tech developers of hyperscale data centers in discussions about locating some of Big Tech’s next centers in Maryland. Of course, as a new vendor in an established market, the consortium would have to offer its reliable massive power capacity at lower rates than the premium rates charged by Dominion .. at first .. after which its performance would move it into a highly profitable virtuous cycle … just like Dominion.
This strategy is not a get-rich-quick scheme. It might take three to four years before the consortium signs its first guaranteed massive power contract with a Big Tech firm.
- First year
-- Negotiations of the state's incentives, the consortium's decision structure, and the terms of profit sharing among the consortium's members. - Second year
-- Modifications to current generators and transmission lines. - Third year
-- Tracking consortium vs Dominion's shares of PJM auction
-- Further modifications reflecting changing relative consortium vs Dominion's shares of PJM auctions - Fourth year
-- Consortium signs initial guaranteed massive capacity contracts with Big Tech
Unfortunately, the residents of all three states have been led to believe by political leaders of all parties that these leaders will "take effective action" to reduce their residents' electricity bills, bills that have been grossly increased by the "evil" data centers. So resident won't wait three years to see lower bills. Nor do they need to wait.
But first, let's talk about the name of the consortium.
According to Wikipedia, Maryland's state seal contains some interesting wording in Latin and a date "1632".
- The Latin means “With favor wilt thou compass us as with a shield”
- 1632 is the year that King Charles granted the charter for Maryland to Cecilius Calvert, the second Lord Baltimore.”—
So the editor suggests that the consortium should be named "Calvert Shield" because it will protect the residents of Maryland by providing power to AI hyperscale centers in ways that will reduce the resident's electricity bills, rather than increase them.
That's the name. Now here's the critical strategy that is embodied in the name. In its second and third years of operation Calvert Shield should provide credits to all residents on their monthly electricity bills from the four utilities. Three lines should appear on each bill:
-- 1. Your normal monthly bill ______
-- 1. Your normal monthly bill ______
-- 2. Credit from Calvert Shield _______
-- 3. You only pay the difference _____
-- 3. You only pay the difference _____
Yes, this is a gimmick, but a politically useful gimmick. Calvert Shield is paying credits before it has earned a dime. But if it has successfully completed its first year, then the state has negotiated binding agreements with its corporate partners that commit it to paying them far larger incentives in the second and third years. These agreements will be on the public record. The costumers of the utilities will be asking “What’s in this for us?” The credits in their bills are the tangible answers they will receive every month.
Of course, if first-year negotiations fail to produce mutually acceptable terms on incentives, procedures, and profit-sharing, the state makes no payments to anyone, and no customer credits appear.
3) Exelon vs. Constellation for Maryland's power … in process …
-- Exelon's offer: "Exelon wants to build a power plant in Maryland, reversing decades of deregulation policy", Christine Condon, Maryland Matters, 11/3/25
-- Constellation's counteroffer: "Constellation Offers Maryland a Menu of New Generation Options to Meet Rising Demand, Including 5,800 Megawatts of New Power Generation and Battery Storage", Constellation Energy, 11/4/25
-- Exelon's offer: "Exelon wants to build a power plant in Maryland, reversing decades of deregulation policy", Christine Condon, Maryland Matters, 11/3/25
-- Constellation's counteroffer: "Constellation Offers Maryland a Menu of New Generation Options to Meet Rising Demand, Including 5,800 Megawatts of New Power Generation and Battery Storage", Constellation Energy, 11/4/25
Note: Constellation was spun off from Exelon in 2022
G. Dominion’s challenge … in process
1) Announcements by Dominion (capacity) … high impact on ordinary user electricity bills
Dominion’s challenge embodies an exquisite collusion of two timelines:
- The imminent collapse of the AI bubble pressures Big Tech to install the hundreds of thousands of Nvidia chips they have already purchased but not yet installed into data centers asap. These chips will be obsolete in three or four years.
- On the other hand the recent elections have sent the loudest possible signals to political leaders of both parties that they cannot endorse any AI developments that make life less affordable, specifically, higher monthly electricity bills will not be tolerated. Indeed the incoming governors of Virginia and New Jersey won by decisive margins in part because they demanded that Big Tech “bring your own power” BYOP
2) The complex array of utilities in Virginia
3) Dominion wants higher benefits for Domination and its data centers while imposing historically higher costs on the non-data center customers in all PJM states, including Virginia
4) Governors can meet these challenge by “slow walking” both proposals and by working together to pressure the PJM to revise the sharing of capacity costs to require data centers to pay the full price of their required power
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